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(rough draft—comments welcome)
In Volume One of Capital, Marx
laid out what he called “The Secret of Capitalist Primitive Accumulation.”
Capitalist accumulation must be preceded by some previous accumulation, “an
accumulation which is not the result of the capitalist mode of production but
its point of departure” (Marx, 1990, p. 873). Marx, identified the
‘double-freedom’ requirement necessary for capitalist production: workers must
be ‘free’ to sell their labor-power and they must be ‘free’ from the means of
production. The existence of a working class ready to sell their labor-power to
capitalists requires that a mass of population have no means of production with
which to produce their own means of subsistence. If they could produce their
own means of subsistence, they would not be compelled to sell their labor-power
to capitalists. A legal system is also required under which workers are freed
from their feudal obligations and by law may enter the market to sell their
labor-power. As Marx wrote, “so-called primitive accumulation, therefore, is
nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the
means of production” (1990, pp. 874-875).
Despite this
emphasis, Marx recognized other important varieties of primitive accumulation as
well as the fact that it played out differently under different historical
conditions. Although many authors associate primitive accumulation primarily
with the enclosures that divorced serfs from the land, creating a landless,
property-less class compelled to sell their labor-power to capital to obtain
their means of subsistence,
Marx uses the term primitive
accumulation much more broadly, to encompass a whole variety of preconditions
and prerequisites for the capitalist mode of production. In addition, in
highlighting the historical processes by which the producers were left without
means of providing their own subsistence, Marx not only was focusing his remarks
on Europe, he actually states that the “classic” case is limited to England,
while the “history of this expropriation assumes different aspects in different
countries, and runs through its various phases in different successions, and at
different historical epochs” (Marx, 1991, p. 876).
In addition to
divorcing the mass of population from the means of production, Marx refers to
the importance of merchant capital; the wealth and resources resulting from
European contact with Asia, Africa, and the Americas; and other processes
contributing to monetization, commoditization, and marketization. In Volume 3
of Capital, Marx notes that merchant capital “is itself a historical
precondition for the development of the capitalist mode of production” (Marx,
1991, p. 444):
There can be no doubt—and this
very fact has led to false conceptions—that the great revolutions that took
place in trade in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, along with the
geographical discoveries of that epoch, and which rapidly advanced the
development of commercial capital, were a major moment in promoting the
transition from the feudal to the capitalist mode of production. The sudden
expansion of the world market, the multiplication of commodities in circulation,
the competition among the European nations for the seizure of Asiatic products
and American treasures, the colonial system, all made a fundamental contribution
towards shattering the feudal barriers to production. (Marx, 1991, p. 450)
Already in Volume 1 Marx had
identified this history as an integral part of primitive accumulation:
The discovery of gold and silver
in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the
indigenous population of that continent, the beginnings of the conquest and
plunder of India, and the conversion of Africa into a preserve for the
commercial hunting of blackskins, are all things that characterize the dawn of
the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief
moments of primitive accumulation. Hard on their heels follows the commercial
war of the European nations, which has the globe as its battlefield. (Marx,
1990, p. 914)
These insights recognize the role
that colonialism and imperialism played in contributing to the establishment of
the capitalist mode of production in Europe, but they do not address the
processes of primitive accumulation in the colonies and territories themselves.
Marx stated that “it is otherwise in the colonies” (Marx, 1990, p. 931), but he
did not document all the particulars of what might be called “colonial
capitalist primitive accumulation.”
Some of Marx’s
additional remarks concerning primitive accumulation in European countries do
provide hints regarding colonial capitalist primitive accumulation.
For example, Marx mentioned the
role of the state, including taxation, as part of primitive accumulation in
Europe. He wrote that:
The different moments of
primitive accumulation can be assigned in particular to Spain, Portugal,
Holland, France, and England, in more or less chronological order. These moments
are systematically combined together at the end of the seventeenth century in
England; the combination embraces the colonies, the national debt, the modern
tax system, and the system of protection. These methods depend in part on brute
force, for instance the colonial system. But, they all employ the power of the
state, the concentrated and organized force of society, to hasten, as in a
hot-house, the process of transformation of the feudal mode of production into
the capitalist mode, and to shorten the transition. Force is the midwife of
every old society which is pregnant with a new one. It is itself an economic
power. (Marx, 1990, pp. 915-916)
And, again:
The modern fiscal system, whose
pivot is formed by taxes on the most necessary means of subsistence...thus
contains within itself the germ of automatic progression. Over-taxation is not
an accidental occurrence, but rather a principle. In Holland, therefore, where
this system was first inaugurated, the great patriot, DeWitt, extolled it in his
Maxims as the best system for making the wage-labourer submissive, frugal,
industrious…and overburdened with work. Here, however, we are less concerned
with the destructive influence it exercises on the situation of the wage-labourer
than with the forcible expropriation, resulting from it, of peasants, artisans,
in short, of all constituents of the lower middle-class. There are no two
opinions about this, even among the bourgeois economists. Its effectiveness as
an expropriating agent is heightened still further by the system of protection,
which forms one of its integral parts. (Marx, 1990, p. 921)
Clearly Marx recognized the role
that the State played, with its “whole series of forcible methods,” but he “only
passed in review those that have been epoch-making as methods of the primitive
accumulation of capital.” (p. 928)
What I am here
calling the colonial capitalist mode of production is similar to what Clive Y.
Thomas has called the “colonial slave mode of production,” in which the “mode
of production was clearly determined by the colonizing power, and was in
no way a “natural” outgrowth of the development of the indigenous communities”
(Thomas, 1984, p. 10). In the colonial capitalist mode of production, “the
process of colonization ultimately required the effective concentration of power
in the hands of the colonizing power” (Thomas, 1984, p. 14), and “…the local
state developed out of the need for an organizing authority to perform certain
“common” functions in the local society and the need to have an “on-the-spot”
public coercive power to guarantee the interests of the dominant local and
colonial interests” (Thomas, 1984, p. 15). Some of these functions “included
overhauling existing land and property arrangements; creating, in place of
slaves, a stable labor supply for commercial agriculture and mining; extending
the use of money and exchange, frequently by requiring the payment of money
taxes and land rent” (Thomas, 1984, pp. 18-19).
A variety of
methods were employed by the colonial powers to force colonial subjects to
become wage-laborers. These included forced labor and varieties of methods to
create a property-less class. But creating a landless, property-less class was
not always preferred by colonial governments. Maintaining ‘reserves’ of some
kind was beneficial to capital, for a number of reasons. If labor was seasonal,
workers could return to home in the off-season and live off the subsistence
base. In this way, wages did not have to be high enough to support workers and
their families year-round, and profits could be higher. Even without seasonal
labor, maintaining a subsistence base could supplement wages, which again would
not have to be high enough reproduce labor-power. The problem was that if the
subsistence base was capable of supporting the population entirely, colonial
subjects would not be compelled to offer their labor-power for sale. Colonial
governments thus required alternative means for compelling the population to
work for wages. The historical record is clear that one very important method
for accomplishing this was to impose a tax and require that the tax obligation
be settled in colonial currency. This method had the benefit of not only
forcing people to work for wages, but also of creating a value for the colonial
currency and monetizing the colony. In addition, this method could be used to
force the population to produce cash crops for sale. What the population had to
do to obtain the currency was entirely at the discretion of the colonial
government, since it was the sole source of the colonial currency. This method
was widespread and important enough to be called “a secret of colonial
capitalist primitive accumulation” (since it was not the only method, it must be
called “a” secret). This practice is extremely well documented, yet it has
hardly ever been mentioned as an important method of primitive accumulation.
If, as Marx stated, “accumulation of capital is…multiplication of the
proletariat,” then direct taxation (and the requirement taxes be paid in money)
was, in the colonies, ‘a secret of so-called primitive accumulation,’ especially
because of the other associated effects, including monetization, marketization,
and commoditization.
Colonial
administrators at first believed that market incentives and persuasion might
result in a forthcoming supply of labor:
Initially the French imagined
that if they would only create new needs for the Africans, the indigenous people
would go out to work. When this did not happen, the French introduced taxes so
as to make Africans earn wages. (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1969, pp. 170-171)
From the first it was assumed
that ample cheap labor was a major asset in Africa…Practical experience soon
showed, however, that Africans did not, as a rule, approximate to Indian
coolies. Few in sub-Saharan African had experience of working for pay or
outside the traditional subsistence economy, and few had any real need to do
so. In course of time monetary incentives might generate a voluntary labor
force, but during the first decades after pacification neither governments nor
private investors could afford to wait indefinitely for the market to work this
revolution. (Fieldhouse, 1971, p. 620)
A number of methods were utilized
to compel Africans to provide labor and cash crops. Among these were work
requirements, pressure for ‘volunteers’, land policy squeezing Africans into
‘reserves’ destroying the subsistence economy, and ‘contracts’ with penal
sanctions (Fieldhouse, 1971, pp. 620-621). But the most successful method
turned out to be direct taxation.
Direct taxation was
used throughout Africa to compel Africans to produce cash crops instead of
subsistence crops and to force Africans to work as wage laborers on European
farms and mines:
In those parts of Africa where
land was still in African hands, colonial governments forced Africans to produce
cash crops no matter how low the prices were. The favourite technique was
taxation. Money taxes were introduced on numerous items—cattle, land,
houses, and the people themselves. Money to pay taxes was got by growing cash
crops or working on European farms or in their mines. (Rodney, 1972, p. 165,
original emphasis)
The requirement that taxes be
paid in colonial currency rather than in-kind was essential to producing the
desired outcome, as well as to monetize the African communities, another part of
colonial capitalist primitive accumulation and helping to create markets for the
sale of European goods:
African economies were monetised
by imposing taxes and insisting on payments of taxes with European currency. The
experience with paying taxes was not new to Africa. What was new was the
requirement that the taxes be paid in European currency. Compulsory payment of
taxes in European currency was a critical measure in the monetization of African
economies as well as the spread of wage labor. (Ake, 1981, pp. 333-334)
Colonial governors
and other administrators were well aware of this ‘secret’ of colonial capitalist
primitive accumulation, although they often justified the taxation on other
grounds, some ideological and others demonstrating the multiple purposes of
taxation from the colonial point of view. “One Governor, Sir Perry Girouard, is
reported to say: ‘We consider that taxation is the only possible method of
compelling the native to leave his reserve for the purpose of seeking work’” (Buell,
1928, p. 331). First Governor General of the Colony and Protectorate of
Nigeria, Sir Frederick Lugard’s Political Memoranda and Political Testimonies
are filled with evidence regarding direct taxation: “Experience seems to point
to the conclusion that in a country so fertile as this, direct taxation is a
moral benefit to the people by stimulating industry and production” (Lugard,
1965a, p. 118). Lugard’s belief that “Direct taxation may be said to be the
corollary of the abolition, however, gradual, of forced labour and domestic
slavery” (1965a, p. 118), acknowledges the role of direct taxation in forcing
Africans to become wage-laborers. Lugard was also clear that the “tax must be
collected in cash wherever possible…The tax thus promotes the circulation of
currency with its attendant benefits to trade” (1965a, p. 132).
Lugard and other
colonial administrators cited a number of other justifications for direct
taxation:
Even though the collection of the
small tribute from primitive tribes may at first seem to give more trouble than
it is worth, it is in my view of great importance as an acknowledgement of
British Suzerainty…It is, moreover, a matter of justice that all should pay
their share alike, whether civilized or uncivilized, and those who pay are quick
to resent the immunity of others. Finally, and in my judgment the most cogent
reason, lies in the fact that the contact with officials, which the assessment
and collection necessitates, brings these tribes into touch with civilizing
influences, and promotes confidence and appreciation of the aims of Government,
with the security it affords from slave raids and extortion.” (Lugard, 1965b,
pp. 129-130)
The tax affords a means to
creating and enforcing native authority, of curbing lawlessness, and assisting
in tribal evolution, and hence it becomes a moral benefit, and is justified by
the immunity from slave-raids which the people now enjoy.” (p. 173)
Taxation was also justified on
grounds that it assisted in ‘civilizing’ African peoples: “For the native,”
Ponty stated in 1911, “taxation, far from being the sign of a humiliating
servitude, is seen rather as proof that he is beginning to rise on the ladder of
humanity, that he has entered upon the path of civilization. To ask him to
contribute to our common expenses is, so to speak, to elevate him in the social
hierarchy” (Conklin, 1997, p. 144). Colonial tax policies were also introduced
in the name of the ‘dignity’ of, and the obligation to, work, where
contact with Europeans again was emphasized:
From this need for native labor,
the theory of the dignity of labor has developed; this dignity has been chiefly
noticeable in connection with labor in the alienated areas. The theory has also
developed that it is preferable for the native to have direct contact with the
white race so that his advance in civilization should be more rapid than if he
remained in his tribal area attending to his own affairs. This is the
“inter-penetration” theory in contrast to the “reserve” or “separation” theory.
(Dilley, 1937, p. 214)
All of these functions of direct
taxation may be seen in some sense as part of colonial capitalist primitive
accumulation, whether as assisting in promoting marketization or serving
ideological functions in the reproduction of the colonial capitalist mode.
Several points
concerning the role of direct taxation in colonial capitalist primitive
accumulation need to be made. First, direct taxation means that the tax cannot
be, e.g., an income tax. An income tax cannot assure that a population that
possesses the means of production to produce their own subsistence will enter
wage labor or grow cash crops. If they simply continue to engage in subsistence
production, they can avoid the cash economy and thus escape the income tax and
any need for colonial currency. The tax must therefore be a direct tax, such as
the poll tax, hut tax, head tax, wife tax, and land tax. Second, although
taxation was often imposed in the name of securing revenue for the colonial
coffers, and the tax was justified in the name of Africans bearing some of the
financial burden of running the colonial state, in fact the colonial government
did not need the colonial currency held by Africans. What they needed was for
the African population to need the currency, and that was the purpose of the
direct tax. The colonial government and European settlers must ultimately be
the source of the currency, so they did not need it from the Africans. It was a
means of compelling the African to sell goods and services, especially labor
services for the currency. Despite the claims by the colonial officials that
the taxes were a revenue source, there is indication that they understood the
working of the system well. For example, often the tax was called a “labor tax”
or “prestation.” Under this system, one was relieved of their tax obligation if
one could show that one had worked for some stated length of time for Europeans
in the previous year (see, e.g., Christopher, 1984, pp. 56-57; Crowder, 1968, p.
185; Davidson, 1974, pp. 256-257; Dilley, 1937, p. 214; Wieschoff, 1944, p.
37). It is clear in this case that the purpose of the tax was not to produce
revenue.
To achieve its
intended effects, it was also important that the direct tax be enforced, and
numerous penalties existed for failing to meet one’s obligation. In German East
Africa, “Sanctions against non-payment were severe—huts were burnt and cattle
confiscated—so tax defaulters were not numerous” (Gann and Duignan, 1977, pp.
202-203). All kinds of harsh penalties for failing to pay taxes have been
documented:
If a man refused to pay his
taxes, the Mossi chief was permitted to sequester his goods and sell them. If
the man had neither the taxes nor the goods, the chief had to send him and his
wife (or wives) to the administrative post to be punished. Sometimes, a man and
his wife would be made to look at the sun from sunrise to sunset while intoning
the prayer Puennam co mam ligidi (“God, give me money”). Other times a
man would be made to run around the administrative post with his wife on his
back; if he had several wives, he had to take each one in turn. Then his wife
or wives had to carry him around. (Skinner, 1970, p. 127)
Collective punishments were also
used widely to enforce the tax. At the very least, failure to “pay could be
met, and regularly was met, by visits from the colonial police and spells of
‘prison labour’.” (Davidson, 1974, pp. 256-257)
Another important
element in assuring the smooth functioning of the direct tax system was keeping
wages low, which had the additional benefit of keeping costs down for private
employers. If wages were too high relative to the tax burden, Africans would
only work enough to pay off their tax obligation and the labor supply would
remain limited:
While taxation is high, wages are
very low. It would not do to pay the Natives too much for they would not work a
day more than it was absolutely necessary to get tax money. So employers pay
the minimum in order to exploit their labourers as long s possible. (Padmore,
1936, p. 67)
Direct taxation was
also used to promote and control migration of wage labor. If wage labor and
money for cash crops was not available locally, Africans were forced to migrate
to plantations and mines to find money wages. Recently, at least one scholar
has challenged the notion that direct taxation was a successful method of
promoting labor migration or as important as many assert:
The evidence available on some of
the most famous taxation policies introduced to create labor migration is that
they failed. It was, in fact, easy for colonial administrators to exaggerate
their power over their subjects. (Manchulle, 1997, p. 8)
Part of Manchulle’s argument
challenges the idea that Africans had no agency in determining their choices,
implied in the idea that they were compelled by taxation to migrate, work for
wages, and grow cash crops:
African societies were not
passive recipients or victims of external changes, but societies that faced
specific historical choices, which they made according to their own historical,
cultural, social, and political backgrounds. (Manchulle, 1997, p. 8)
Manchulle’s point concerning
agency is an important one. However, some of the historical and political
context in which African peoples were making their decisions included the force
of the colonial state and the strict enforcement of tax policies, including the
kinds of penalties cited above. Surely this must be considered when assessing
the outcome of colonial tax policies. The evidence offered by Manchulle is
limited to the Soninke people of Upper Senegal. Of course it is possible that
the Soninke case is different, and Manchulle’s plea that “it would be useful if
such evidence contributed to a reexamination of the issue by historians” rightly
urges additional research. Manchulle writes, perhaps correctly for some anyway,
that “Few of the scholars who cite taxation and coercion as a cause in labor
migration have made a critical assessment of the question on the basis of
available documents, in particular quantitative commercial and taxation records”
(Manchulle, 1997, p. 8). This is another important suggestion. Certainly there
is a significant body of historical evidence concerning direct taxation, and it
should be researched thoroughly. It is also not clear whether Manchulle also
rejects the claims that direct taxation was used to generate wage-labor and
encourage cash crop production, monetization, and marketization, or whether the
claim is limited to the case of migration. If so, it would seem even harder to
support, but even the migration case appears sketchy, as the case of Southern
Africa would demonstrate (see, e.g., Greenberg, 1987; Groves, 1969; Onselan,
1976). But Manchulle’s call for research should be heeded. Not only should the
role of direct taxation be studied in Africa and other colonial contexts, its
role in European capitalist primitive accumulation should be investigated as
well.
Direct taxation was
used to force Africans to work as wage laborers, to compel them to grow cash
crops, to stimulate labor migration and control labor supply, and to monetize
the African economies. Part of this latter was to further incorporate African
economies into the larger emerging global capitalist system as purchasers of
European goods. If Africans were working as wage laborers or growing cash crops
instead of producing their own subsistence, they would be forced to purchase
their means of subsistence, and that increasingly meant purchasing European
goods, providing European capital with additional markets. It thus also
promoted, in various ways, marketization and commoditization. We have also seen
that taxation was related to a variety of ideological aspects related to the
reproduction of colonial relations of production. Direct taxation was thus an
important ‘secret of colonial capitalist primitive accumulation.’ It appears to
have been one of the most powerful policies in terms of both its wide variety of
functions, its universality in the African colonial context, and its success in
achieving its intended effects. Of course, taxation was not the sole
determinant of primitive accumulation. But it has certainly been
under-recognized in the literature on primitive accumulation. The history of
direct taxation in colonial capitalism also has some wider theoretical
implications. It shows, for example, “that ‘monetization’ did not spring forth
from barter; nor did it require ‘trust’—as most stories about the origins of
money claim” (Wray, 1998, p. 61). In the colonial capitalist context, money was
clearly a “creature of the state”.

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