Money and inflation are closely associated with one another, both in the
popular mind and in many economic approaches. In this chapter, we will explore
theoretical approaches to money and inflation, and will examine the supposed
links between the two. In the original Guide, Basil Moore argued
"There is yet no formal post-Keynesian theory of money that would
correspond to the orthodox Keynesian or monetarist views on the subject."
(P. 120) He traced the outline of the Post Keynesian (PK) alternative,
stressing the importance of historical time and hence the value of liquidity
in an uncertain world. He also summarized what came to be known as the
"horizontalist" endogenous money approach, emphasizing that central
banks cannot control the money supply. He linked money, finance, and
investment along lines suggested first by Keynes (mainly in his
post-General Theory articles) and later by Kalecki, and emphasized (as
did Minsky) that the particular way in which investment is financed in a
capitalist economy is likely to generate cyclical behavior. He argued that the
dominant PK approach to inflation singles out wage growth in excess of
productivity growth as the proximate cause. He concluded that only three
alternatives exist for inflation policy: do nothing, in which case inflation
would accelerate; raise unemployment to fight inflation; or adopt tax-based
incomes policy (TIP -- which became the best-known PK policy recommendation of
the 1970s).
I do not wish to repeat Moore's arguments here, nor do I wish to critique
them. Most of his analysis has withstood the test of time, indeed, for the
most part, his outline has become the PK alternative. What I want to do
instead is to update and extend his analysis, and, more importantly, to
provide an overview of the most recent advances in PK thought on these issues.
I take it for granted that readers are somewhat familiar with endogenous
money, uncertainty, the role of time, and the importance of liquidity. I
will go back to earlier authors, but mainly to trace fruitful lines of
research that had not been pursued in the original
Guide -- lines that are still largely under construction. Along
the way, the perceptive reader will find that some lines of thought emphasized
a generation ago by PK scholars have largely fallen out of the favor of
younger scholars. Most obviously, I would place the earlier PK approach to
anti-inflation policy (TIP) in that category. In addition, I would suggest
that recent PK work places somewhat less emphasis on uncertainty as the sole
raison d'être for the study of money. Rather, it goes back to another
line suggested by Keynes -- the Chartalist approach. We will first look
at the orthodox approach, then will examine the Chartalist approach, and
finally will turn to the PK approach.
Brief Overview of Orthodox Approach
The modern orthodox approach reaches its highest degree of development in
general equilibrium theory (GET), as represented by the Arrow-Debreu model.
GET is based on an assumption of perfect competition and perfect knowledge. An
auctioneer announces a vector of relative prices for all scarce commodities;
relative prices adjust until all excess demand (or excess supply) is
eliminated, at which point all advantageous trades occur. As Hahn (1983) has
argued, there is no room for money in this sort of economy. Indeed, while one
might arbitrarily choose any particular commodity to serve as numeraire, such
that each commodity could have a "nominal" price in terms of the numeraire
commodity, nominal prices would be insignificant. As such, neither money nor
inflation (which is necessarily a nominal concept) can be a concern of GET.
Thus, money is introduced into orthodox economics on an ad hoc basis, merely
to determine unimportant nominal prices and inflation. (Ingham, 2000, argues
there are no microfoundations for money in the neoclassical
model.)
While it is recognized that in fact banks create most of our money supply,
they are supposedly constrained by reserves of high powered money (HPM, also
called the monetary base). Given a relatively stable "deposit multiplier"
(itself a function of the ratio of reserves held against deposits), the supply
of deposits will then be determined by the quantity of loans demanded and the
quantity of reserves supplied. Governments are said to exert substantial
control over this, first by dictating what will be held as reserves, and
second by establishing a legally required reserve ratio. Thus, in the modern
economy, the money supply consists of bank deposits (created as banks make
loans) plus the portion of fiat money created by government that is not held
by banks as reserves. Banks have some influence over the portion of fiat money
held by the nonbanking public as they can offer to pay interest to induce the
public to hold deposits rather than fiat money. However, given preferences of
the public, deposit interest rates, and required reserve ratios, the
government "exogenously" controls the money supply through its supply of fiat
money to be held as banking system reserves. Hence, most orthodox monetary
theory simply begins with the presumption that the money supply is determined
by government policy; Friedman's (1969, p. 4) famous declaration that we might
as well assume that money is dropped from central bank helicopters is a good,
albeit extreme, example.
Orthodoxy used to make a distinction between the short run and the long run,
based on a famous dichotomy presented by Friedman (1968). He had argued that
if the government increased the rate of growth of the money supply above the
rate expected by the population, it might temporarily "fool" people by causing
higher than expected inflation. Until the higher inflation rate was
recognized, some individuals might believe that real, inflation-adjusted,
prices had been affected, inducing them to change behavior. This was supposed
to explain why an increase of the money supply might have a real effect,
namely, a tendency to cause a short run increase of employment and output.
Over the long run, however, everyone would realize that the money supply
growth rate (and thus inflation) was higher than anticipated, causing each to
revert to previous (and optimal) behavior. Thus, in the long run, money would
be "neutral", affecting only nominal prices. Rational expectations, however,
modified this distinction between the short run and long run by insisting that
predictable government policy could never fool people (on average), thus could
not have even short run real effects. Only random policy would allow for short
run non-neutrality. Otherwise, money only determines nominal
prices.
Finally, because of this supposed link between money and inflation, orthodox
policy has traditionally focused on controlling money growth in order to
control inflation. Friedman's famous monetary growth rate rule would tie the
government to a commitment to keep the growth rate of the money supply at some
low and constant rate--ideally, close to the long run average growth rate of
real GDP. This would ensure long run stability of the aggregate price level.
Three decades ago, there was some debate between the "Keynesian" and
monetarist branches of orthodoxy over a) the ability of the government to
closely control money supply growth, and b) the possibility of short run
non-neutrality. Keynesians tended to emphasize instability of the deposit
multiplier, and the possible use of monetary policy to "fine tune" real GDP by
exploiting temporary non-neutrality. However, after Brunner "demonstrated"
that the central bank could easily offset any instability of the deposit
multiplier (through slightly larger adjustments of aggregate reserves) in 1968
(and this was later confirmed in Balbach, 1982), the argument that the
government might not be able to control the money supply virtually disappeared
from the literature. Furthermore, rational expectations effectively eliminated
any discussion of use of monetary policy for short run fine-tuning. Thus, by
the late 1970s, orthodoxy reached a consensus that monetary policy should be
focused on control of the money supply in order to control
inflation.
This culminated in the disastrous Volcker experiment in the USA (replicated in
the UK) in which the Fed tried to target reserves in order to hit monetary
growth rate targets. (See Fazzari and Minsky 1984) Leaving aside the various
(real) economic problems created by this policy, the most surprising thing for
orthodox economists was that a) any correlation between money growth and
inflation disappeared (or, worse, turned negative), and b) the Fed
consistently missed its targets. While Friedman (1984) wrote an interesting
post mortem article claiming that the Fed simply had not tried hard enough to
hit targets, in practice, after the debacle the Fed first tried experimenting
with alternative definitions of money, but by the end of the 1980s simply
abandoned any pretense of targeting monetary aggregates. (Papadimitriou and
Wray 1996) More importantly, orthodox economists reluctantly came to the
conclusion that money growth and inflation are not reliably linked in any
manner that allows for policy formulation. The implication of all this is that
during the 1990s monetary policy in much of the world was shifted away from
attempts to control money growth and toward direct control of inflation. While
orthodoxy had no plausible explanation regarding the link between monetary
policy and inflation (indeed, there was little attempt made to explain
precisely which tools government might use to affect inflation), most orthodox
economists came to believe that monetary policy directly sets the inflation
rate, without growth of the money supply playing any intermediary link. The
central bank should simply "tighten" monetary policy (presumably, raise
interest rates) to fight inflation; appropriateness of monetary policy can be
gauged by looking to the rate of inflation that results.
Keynes, Knapp, and The Neo-Chartalist Approach
Recent PK work on money has been based on a neo-Chartalist, or state money,
approach. The most important early contributor to this approach was Knapp,
whose work heavily influenced Keynes. The most recent pre-cursor to the
revival of this approach was Lerner, whose 1947 AER article was titled "money
as a creature of the state". This approach leads to conclusions very different
very different from those of orthodoxy regarding the origins and functions of
money, the relation between national sovereignty and currency, appropriate
monetary policy, and the relations between money and prices. In this section
we will examine the neo-Chartalist (nC) approach, while in the final two
sections we will link this more directly to Post Keynesian theories of money,
prices, and inflation.
Unlike the orthodox approach, which emphasizes the medium of exchange function
of money and imagines that money evolved out of barter, Keynes focused on the
unit of account function of money and the role of the State in establishing
the money of account. In the Treatise, Keynes had argued "Money proper in the
full sense of the term can only exist in relation to a money of account"
(Keynes 1930, p. 3), hinting that the unit of account must pre-exist use of a
medium of exchange (or, at the very least, be created simultaneously).
Elsewhere, he went further in arguing "Now for most important social and
economic purposes what matters is the money of account; for it is the money of
account which is the subject." (Keynes 1982, p. 252) According to Keynes, the
money of account "comes into existence along with Debts, which are contracts
for deferred payment, and Price-Lists, which are offers of contracts for sale
or purchase... Money itself... derives its character from its relationship to
the Money-of-Account, since the debts and prices must first have been
expressed in terms of the latter". (Keynes 1930, p. 3) Keynes emphasized the
role played by the state in first establishing a money of account -- or what
Ingham (2000) has called "value in the abstract". Keynes argued "Chartalism
begins when the State designates the objective standard which shall correspond
to the money-of-account" (Keynes 1930, p. 11) The "right" to designate the
money of account "is claimed by all modern states and has been so claimed for
some four thousand years at least." (Keynes 1930, p. 4) While Keynes did not
go so far as to claim that money originated as a state-designated unit of
account, he did emphasize that for "at least" the past four thousand years,
the state has claimed "the right to determine and declare what thing [money]
corresponds to the name [unit of account], and to vary its declaration from
time to time". (Ibid, p. 4) Thus, it is no coincidence to find that the one
nation-one money phenomenon is so ubiquitous around the world today and
throughout recorded history.Just how does a state adopt a unit of account, or
"write the dictionary" as Keynes put it? Some, including Schumpeter () and
Davidson (1978), have emphasized legal tender laws -- the state issues a
currency in terms of a unit of account, then passes laws that require
"acceptation" of that currency in designated (public and private) payments.
Knapp, however, doubted that this would be sufficient, arguing that such laws
"merely express a pious hope". (Knapp 1924, p. 111) In Knapp's view, the state
does play a critical role in determining what will serve as the unit of
account, for trying to "deduce" the monetary system "without the idea of a
State" is "absurd", but the state establishes the money of account when it
determines what will be "accepted at public pay offices", rather than through
"jurisprudence". (Knapp 1924, pp. Vii-viii; 40) Keynes endorsed this view,
arguing "Knapp accepts as ‘Money'-rightly I think- anything which the State
undertakes to accept at its pay-offices, whether or not it is declared
legal-tender between its citizens". (Keynes 1930, pp. 6-7) Later, Abba Lerner
explained
The modern state can make anything it chooses generally acceptable as
money... It is true that a simple declaration that such and such is money will
not do, even if backed by the most convincing constitutional evidence of the
state's absolute sovereignty. But if the state is willing to accept the
proposed money in payment of taxes and other obligations to itself the trick
is done. Everyone who has obligations to the state will be willing to accept
the pieces of paper with which he can settle the obligations, and all other
people will be willing to accept these pieces of paper because they know that
the taxpayers, etc., will accept them in turn." (Lerner 1947, p. 313)
In the orthodox story, market participants "spontaneously" decide to use some
relatively scarce, hence valuable, commodity as a medium of exchange. A few
orthodox economists still argue that if only we returned to a gold standard
that required full gold backing against paper money, this would provide for a
money with stable value. The nC approach insists that money does not derive
its value from the commodity from which it is manufactured (nor from reserves
of a commodity held against its issue in the case of a paper money), but
rather from the willingness of the state to accept it to retire obligations to
the state. As Keynes argued, "money is the measure of value, but to regard it
as having value itself is a relic of the view that the value of money is
regulated by the value of the substance of which it is made, and is like
confusing a theatre ticket with the performance" (Keynes 1983, p. 402). A
theater ticket has value not because it is manufactured from precious aper but
rather because it is accepted as payment for entry to the performance. Adam
Smith had long ago recognized that "A prince, who should enact that a certain
proportion of his taxes should be paid in a paper money of a certain kind,
might thereby give a certain value to this paper money; even though the term
of its final discharge and redemption should depend altogether upon the will
of the prince." (Smith 1937, p. 312) Echoing Smith, Minsky argued "the fact
that taxes need to be paid gives value to the money of the economy... [T]he
need to pay taxes means that people work and produce in order to get that in
which taxes can be paid." (Minsky 1986, p. 231) Goodhart argued that "the
state levies taxes and can insist that these be paid in state-issued money.
This ensures that such fiat currency will have some value." (Goodhart 1989, p.
36) Even the "Keynesian" Tobin has lately recognized that "By its willingness
to accept a designated asset in settlement of taxes and other obligations, the
government makes that asset acceptable to any who have such obligations, and
in turn to others who have obligations to them, and so on." (Tobin 1998, p.
27) Thus, recent PK research has emphasized that the State chooses the unit of
account in which obligations to the state are denominated, it imports
moneyness (or liquidity) to those things it accepts in payments, and it
ensures all this by imposing money-denominated liabilities (for example,
taxes).
The Post Keynesian Approach to Money and Inflation
The specific contributions made by Post Keynesians in recent years to money
and inflation include:
- Detailed attention to Keynesian uncertainty as a major motivating factor
for hoarding money;
- Revival of the "monetary theory of production", advanced by Marx and
further articulated by Keynes;
- Extension of the analysis of the monetary circuit begun in France by Le Bourva
and in the US by Schumpeter;
- Detailed investigation of central bank operations, leading to the
"horizontalist" approach that denies that reserves are discretionary;
- An alternative approach to micro-level price formation, rejecting the
market-clearing approach of orthodoxy and substituting an "administered" price
approach; and
- An "incomes" approach to inflation in place of a "monetary"
approach.
Certainly, this does not exhaust all the contributions made by Post Keynesians
in this area, nor do we wish to suggest that there is no controversy over
these even among Post Keynesians. For the most part, we will be brief on the
controversies; however, we will offer an alternative to the "incomes" approach
to inflation, informed by the neo-Chartalist approach to money outlined above.
We will deal with the first four points here and the last two in the final
section.
The topic of Keynesian uncertainty is dealt with elsewhere in this volume
(Rosser 200x), but no discussion of the Post Keynesian approach to money can
completely ignore this topic. Keynes insisted that "our desire to hold money
as a store of wealth is a barometer of the degree of our distrust of our own
calculations and conventions concerning the future... The possession of actual
money lulls our disquietude... (Keynes 1973, p. 116-7) Post Keynesians,
especially those who follow Davidson's (1978) lead, emphasize that many
important economic outcomes are "nonergodic", in the sense that it is not
possible to calculate a probability distribution for alternative events.
According to Davidson, this is an important reason for the use of monetary
contracts -- legally enforceable contracts written in the money of account.
Holding money always increases liquidity, defined as the ability to meet
contractual obligations as they come due. Post Keynesians also follow Keynes
in asserting that money has two special characteristics, a zero elasticity of
production (which simply means that when the demand for money rises, labor is
not put to use to produce more of it) and a near-zero elasticity of
substitution (so that when money demand rises, it has no close substitutes to
satisfy the demand).
These special characteristics, together with existence of Keynesian
uncertainty, ensure that money cannot be neutral. When "disquietude" about the
future rises, people wish to hold more liquidity -- or, "money demand"
rises. However, because there are no close substitutes and because labor will
not be directed toward producing more money, the rising demand for liquidity
cannot be met. Instead, asset prices must fall (interest rates must rise)
until people become satisfied to hold the existing amount of money. When
"demand prices" (the prices people are willing to pay) fall below "supply
prices" for capital, investment collapses and causes output to fall through
the multiplier. On the other hand, when people become optimistic about the
future, the desire to hold liquidity (money) falls, raising prices of
alternative assets (as people try to rid themselves of money holdings by
purchasing assets instead) and lowering interest rates. When demand prices for
capital assets rise above supply prices, more capital is produced and
investment rises, raising output through the multiplier. Thus, it is argued,
money is not neutral because the desire for liquidity in an uncertain world
generates real effects on production and employment.
This argument should not be interpreted as suggesting that the supply of money
or liquidity is normally "fixed" (or, exogenously determined). Indeed, Keynes
had argued that when spending is increasing, the money supply normally expands
as banks allow "overdrafts". Moore (1988) and other Post Keynesians have noted
that firms normally negotiate lines of credit which allow them to increase
their borrowing as needed to finance expanded production. On the other hand,
when desired spending is falling, the supply of loans and hence the money
supplied by banks will contract. Thus, the money supply, broadly defined to
include bank deposits, will normally expand and contract endogenously with the
business cycle. Indeed, when expectations about the future collapse and people
desire to hold more liquidity, the money supply might actually shrink.
Robinson had argued that expectations thus count "twice over" when the money
supply is endogenous -- first because rising uncertainty increases
liquidity preference and thus the desire to hold money, and second because
these same expectations will reduce desired spending and thus bank loans and
deposits. This is why Wray (1990) , Dow and Dow (1989), Dalziel (1996, 2000)
and others have argued that it is best to distinguish liquidity preference
from money demand, with the former used to describe a preference for holding
money and other liquid assets ("hoarding"), while the latter is used to
describe a desire to obtain money in order to spend ("money on the wing", so
to speak). Rising money demand will normally cause the money supply to expand,
while rising liquidity preference will not (and indeed may be associated with
falling money supply).
In early drafts of the General Theory, Keynes had indicated that he was
developing a monetary theory of production -- that is, a general theory
of an economy in which production begins and ends with money. This was, of
course, similar to Marx's M-C-M' scheme according to which production begins
with money (M), which purchases commodities to produce other commodities (C,
or more technically, C-P-C'), which are then sold to realize more money (where
M'>M if profits are realized). Keynes juxtaposed his approach to the
orthodox approach:
An economy, which uses money but uses it merely as a neutral link between
transactions in real things and real assets and does not allow it to enter
into motives or decisions, might be called -- for want of a better
name -- a real-exchange economy. The theory which I desiderate
would deal, in contradistinction to this, with an economy in which money plays
a part of its own and affects motives and decisions and is, in short one of
the operative factors in the situation... And it is this which we ought to mean
when we speak of a monetary economy. (Keynes 1973, pp. 408-9)
Thus, the monetary theory of production applies to a monetary economy, or one
in which money can never be neutral even in the long run. This should be
distinguished from the imaginary orthodox economy in which money simply
replaces barter without entering itself into decision processes. In the GT,
Keynes explained that the importance of this distinction lies in the tendency
for the economy to move toward full employment. In Keynes's "monetary
economy", there are no "natural" or market forces that would push the economy
to full employment equilibrium; indeed, he argued that for each interest rate
(itself determined by the interplay of liquidity preference and the supply of
liquid assets) there would be a different equilibrium level of
employment -- but only one of these equilibria would represent a position
of full employment. For reasons that we won't go into here, Keynes argued that
the special properties of money made it likely that equilibrium would be
achieved before full employment was reached, and that existence of
unemployment would tend to set in motion processes that would move the economy
further away from full employment. In contrast, in the orthodox model, money
is neutral (at least in the long run) and cannot prevent achievement of full
employment equilibrium (at least in the long run).
According to PK theory, the cycle is, for the most part, a monetary
phenomenon -- not a "real" phenomenon -- in the sense that the cause
is monetary and this generates real effects (on employment and output). In
contrast, orthodoxy explains short run deviations from equilibrium as a result
of temporary "fooling", requireing essentially random "money shocks" in which
the central bank arbitrarily increases or reduces the rate of growth of the
money supply. Otherwise, the cycle is explained as a result of shocks to
"real" variables (such as labor productivity), as in the Real Business Cycle
theory. In this approach, every point of the cycle is represented as an
optimal, equilibrium, position -- thus, there is never any involuntary
unemployment. Thus, the PK approach puts money center stage in its explanation
of the business cycle, while orthodoxy either eliminates it entirely, or
relies on "exogenous money surprises" to explain the cycle.
While American PK analysts tended to focus on money as a stock variable (held
as the most liquid asset as a sort of insurance in an uncertain world), the
Circuit school (mainly in France led by Le Bourva and later by Parguez and
Schmitt, but also in Italy led by Graziani) emphasized money as a flow
variable required to finance spending. Actually, Schumpeter can probably be
seen as the father of this approach, as his concern with the role that credit
creation plays in financing entrepreneurial activity actually pre-dates
Keynes's General Theory. (See Wray 1994, Parguez 1996, Lavoie 1992, and
Nell and Deleplace 1996.) Briefly, "Circuitistes" generally begin with a bank
advance of credit to a firm to engage in production, in which bank deposits
are created simultaneously with the bank loan ("loans make deposits"). They
then trace through the monetary flows as the bank deposits finance production
(flowing from firms to workers) and then consumption (flowing back from
consumers to firms). At this point, the firms are able to retire their loans,
which extinguishes both the loan and the deposit ("destroying" the money that
had been created). Thus, this approach adopts an "endogenous money" view
according to which banks create the finance required, and, equally important,
the necessity of such finance is emphasized as a pre-condition to any
production actually taking place. Many aspects of Circuit analysis have been
adopted within PK formulations, and have helped to rectify the earlier
imbalance in which analysis was too preoccupied with stocks and insufficient
attention had been given to flows. Post Keynesians now generally recognize
that money is important both as a stock to be held to reduce insecurity, but
it is also important to trace-out the monetary flows that are the financial
counterparts to any "real" spending and income flows.
Above we had discussed the orthodox belief that the government controls the
money supply through control over bank reserves. In nations with a legally
required reserve ratio, how can banks simply expand the money supply
"endogenously" to meet demand, as Post Keynesians believe they do? Banks, like other firms, take positions in assets by issuing
liabilities on the expectation of making profits. Much bank activity can be
analyzed as a "leveraging" of HPM -- because banks issue liabilities that can be
exchanged on demand for HPM on the expectation that they can obtain HPM as
necessary to meet withdrawals--but many other firms engage in similar
activity. For our purposes, however, the main difference between banks and
other types of firms involves the nature of the liabilities. Banks "make
loans" by purchasing IOUs of "borrowers"; this results in a bank
liability--usually a demand deposit, at least initially--that shows up as an
asset ("money") of the borrower. Thus, the "creditors" of a bank are created
simultaneously with the "debtors" to the bank. The creditors will almost
immediately exercise their right to use the created demand deposit as a medium
of exchange.
Indeed, bank liabilities are the primary money used by non-banks. The
government accepts some bank liabilities in payment of taxes, and it
guarantees that many bank liabilities are redeemable at par against fiat
money. In turn, reserves are the "money" used as means of payment (or
inter-bank settlement) among banks and for payments made to the central bank;
as bank "creditors" draw down demand deposits, this causes a clearing drain
for the individual bank. The bank may then operate either on its asset side
(selling an asset) or on its liability side (borrowing reserves) to cover the
loss of reserves. In the aggregate, however, such activities only shift
reserves from bank-to-bank. Aggregate excesses or deficiencies of reserves
have to be rectified by the central bank. Actually, reserve deficiencies
automatically lead to an "overdraft" loan of reserves by the central bank.
Ultimately, then, reserves are not discretionary in the short run; the central
bank can (and must) determine the price of reserves--admittedly, within some
constraints--but then must provide reserves more-or-less on demand to hit its
"price" target (the fed funds rate in the US, or the bank rate in the UK).
This is because excess or deficient reserves would cause the fed funds rate
(or bank rate) to move away from the target.
This has been called the "horizontalist" approach, in the sense that the
supply of bank money is determined "endogenously" by the demand for bank
loans, rather than "exogenously". (Moore 1988) Any impact of monetary policy
on the quantity of money is very indirect and operates primarily through
interest rate effects, and it is mainly the private demand for loans, plus the
willingness of banks to lend, that determines the quantity of loans, and thus,
of deposits, created. The supply of loans is then never independent of the
demand; banks supply loans only because someone is willing to "borrow" bank
money by issuing an IOU to banks. One can think of the supply of bank money as
"horizontal" at the loan rate of interest, with banks supplying loans on
demand. The analogy with a horizontal supply curve is useful to emphasize that
the supply of bank money depends on the supply of loans which is not under
control of the government as in the verticalist story of
orthodoxy.
Another conclusion that follows from such an analysis is that the interest
rate cannot be determined by the "supply and demand" of loans if supply and
demand are not independent. Rather, banks can be characterized as
price-setters in short-term retail loan markets; they then meet the demand for
loans--with some quantity rationing--at that price. Short-term retail interest
rates can be taken as a mark-up over short-term wholesale interest rates.
Exactly what determines the mark-up (and whether it is variable) is
controversial, but not important to our analysis here. Wholesale interest
rates, finally, are under the control of central bank policy. Most banks will
not be able to match exactly their retail loans and deposits; some banks will
be able to make more retail loans than they can retain in deposits (suffering
a clearing drain), while others will find fewer loan customers than depositors
(resulting in a surplus reserve position). Banks then use wholesale markets to
borrow reserves by issuing wholesale liabilities (e.g., negotiable, large
denomination CDs, or borrowing fed funds), while surplus banks will lend fed
funds. The central bank sets the overnight interbank rate, its main policy
tool. This rate then determines other short-term wholesale rates (mainly as a
mark-up, but also as a mark-down) through arbitrage. Thus, another tenet of
the horizontalist approach is that the central bank determines the short-term
wholesale interest rate directly, and the short-term retail lending rate
indirectly (as the wholesale rate is marked-up). In conclusion, the
supply of money is determined endogenously while the
price of money (short-term interest rate) is determined
exogenously as a result of central bank policy.
Obviously, reserves are not a discretionary policy instrument, according to
the Post Keynesian view. Most bank reserves are actually supplied by the
Treasury as a result of "fiscal policy" (spending by government). When the
Treasury emits a check, this is normally deposited into the banking system,
adding reserves. On the other hand, when a taxpayer writes a check to the IRS,
this results in a debit to the reserves of the banking system as a whole.
Thus, government deficits lead to a net injection of bank reserves while
government budget surpluses result in a net drain of bank reserves. Obviously,
government spending and tax receipts are never matched perfectly on a
day-to-day basis, even if the budget is balanced over the course of the year.
This means that each day, activities by the fiscal branch of government will
cause large fluctuations of banking system reserves. For this reason, the
central bank intervenes on a daily basis to offset impacts caused by fiscal
operations. The main instrument used is the purchase or sale of government
bonds to add or drain reserves, respectively. Note, however, that these daily
interventions are necessarily defensive. In many nations, reserves do not earn
interest, thus, banks attempt to rid themselves of excess reserves at the end
of each banking day. Any system-wide excess of reserves causes immediate
pressure on the overnight inter-bank lending rate as there will be offers of
reserves to lend, but no bids by borrowers -- effectively causing the overnight
rate to go to zero. On the other hand, if banks are caught at the end of the
day short of reserves, there will be bids but no offers, causing the overnight
rate to rise. Thus, in order to maintain orderly markets in interbank lending,
and in order to hit its overnight interest rate target, the central bank must
intervene to ensure that actual reserves are at the desired level. This means
that the central bank can never use open market operations as an offensive
policy instrument. The orthodox exposition in every money and banking
textbook, which begins with an open market purchases that causes bank lending
and deposits to rise through a multiplier process is actually an impossible
fiction because the excess reserves so created would cause the fed funds rate
to go to zero immediately, and keep it there until all the excess reserves
could be absorbed -- which could take weeks or months.
Central banks also engage in a wide variety of supervisory and regulatory
activities that are not usually thought of as monetary policy, narrowly
defined. For example, central banks or other branches of government (such as
the Federal Depository Insurance Corporation in the USA) determine capital
adequacy requirements, sometimes adopt temporary credit controls, and
generally encourage certain kinds of lending while discouraging other types.
In many countries, some sort of deposit insurance policy ensures that bank
deposits will always maintain parity against the unit of account (essentially,
this means that the bank cannot declare bankruptcy, although it may well
become insolvent and require resolution). More importantly, central banks act
as lenders of last resort to intervene when the banking system faces a "run",
as depositors attempt to convert deposits to HPM. It has been recognized for
more than a century and a half that willingness to lend reserves without limit
when the banking system is in trouble is the prescription for a "liquidity
crisis". (Bagehot 1927) Although generalized bank runs are a thing of the past
for all the developed countries, central banks still intervene on a relatively
frequent basis to protect individual banks or specific market
instruments.
The Post Keynesian Theory of Inflation
Recall that in the orthodox approach, an "invisible hand" process establishes
equilibrium relative prices that simultaneously clear all markets. Each
individual relative price reflects relative scarcity. Nominal prices, in turn,
are established in terms of one of the commodities -- a numeraire -- and (at least
in the long run) are determined as some scalar times the relative price
vector. Holding velocity constant, the aggregate price level is simply
determined by the quantity of the money commodity. Post Keynesians reject
every aspect of this formulation. First, what matters is nominal price, not
"real" or relative price (which is simply a residual calculated by dividing
nominal price by some index number). Second, most prices are "administered" to
accomplish a number of firm-specific goals, and no priority is given to
"market clearing" over other goals. And, third, the quantity of money is
"endogenously" determined so that the causation of the "quantity equation" is
essentially reversed with price times quantity determining the quantity of
money required (given velocity -- although Post Keynesians do not take velocity
to be "fixed").
The Post Keynesian approach to pricing, especially the approach to the pricing
decisions made at the individual level of the firm, is dealt with in another
chapter (Lavoie). However, it is useful to briefly examine Hyman Minsky's
views on price formation in order to provide the background to the Post
Keynesian approach to inflation -- or determination of prices at the macro level.
(See Minsky 1986; Papadimitriou and Wray, forthcoming.) In Minsky's approach,
all financial commitments are in nominal terms and all income flows are in
nominal terms. It matters whether an economic unit's nominal inflow is greater
than its nominal outflow, hence, money cannot be neutral in this sort of
world. This view is similar to the "monetary theory of production" briefly
examined above, however, Minsky's analysis focuses in greater detail upon
modern financial relations. In the real world, nominal prices are
administered, in large part to gain control over nominal inflows, while
relative prices are just a residual that is mainly
nondiscretionary.
Minsky (1986, Chapter 7) argued that prices in a monetary production economy
perform five main functions: Prices (1) ensure a surplus is generated, (2)
ensure that at least some of the surplus goes to owners of capital, (3) ensure
the market (or demand) price of capital assets is consistent with current
production costs (or supply price), (4) ensure obligations on business debts
can be fulfilled, and (5) ensure resources are directed toward the investment
sector, that is, to allow accumulation of capital. Let us briefly examine
these points.
Post Keynesians adopt an aggregate markup theory of pricing in which price is
determined at the macro level as a markup over labor costs. The price of
consumption goods must be high enough above wages in that sector so that some
consumption goods will be left for workers in other sectors. This allows some
workers to be put in the investment sector (and government and trade sectors)
to produce the surplus (goods and services) that workers cannot buy. At the
micro level, each capitalist must be able to obtain a markup over labor costs,
ability to do which depends in part on market power. However, at the macro
level, there won't be any profits to distribute unless there is spending in
excess of the wage bill in the consumption sector. The aggregate, macro, price
level determines the aggregate potential surplus to be divided among all the
firms in society; the capitals then compete at the micro level for profit
flows. What generates this aggregate surplus to be realized by firms at the
micro level? As the Kalecki equation shows, the aggregate amount of profits is
identically equal to the sum of investment plus consumption out of profits
plus the government's deficit and the trade surplus, less saving out of wages.
In the simplest model (no government deficit, balanced trade, and no saving
out of wages), profits equal investment plus capitalist consumption. If the
price is set high enough that workers cannot buy all the output, capitalists
can get the rest so long as they spend.
At the individual level, market share is important to maintain a sufficient
markup--the source of profits at the micro level. Normally, a firm cannot even
obtain finance unless it has market power. Each firm tries to set a price high
enough to cover all expected costs and to provide a margin of safety. The
bigger the margin of safety, the more willing banks are to lend. To put it
very simply, the goal of every firm is to get market power so that it will
have control over its markup so that it can get loans. Thus, the ability to
set and maintain price is critical at the micro level to obtain loans and to
service them. Indeed, Schumpeter (1934, p. 70) argued that credit is the means
by which capitalists ensure they can divert the allocation of resources to the
investment sector. (See Wray 1994) Market power and the ability to set price
is critical in determining who gets credit, but the amount of surplus
available at the aggregate level depends on the aggregate markup. This, in
turn, depends on capitalist spending, mainly on investment, although it is
supplemented by government deficit spending and trade surpluses in the
expanded model. In other words, market power and even technological efficiency
only affect the distribution of profits, but not the aggregate amount. It is
the aggregate spending on investment that generates the profits that validate
the accumulated capital.
In this sort of world, with ability to affect price, and with expected price
rather than actual price as the critical parameter, there is no reason to
believe that equilibrium exists and even less to believe that it would be
stable. In other words, the prices in the real world are nominal, rather than
"real", and are "administered" to achieve a variety of goals -- not simply to
"clear" markets. This is not to suggest that firms can achieve desired
prices -- as discussed, the aggregate "markup" that can be achieved depends on
aggregate spending (investment, government deficit, trade surplus) and if that
level is too low, capitalists on average will not achieve desired markups (in
other words, actual prices realized will be below those that were
desired).
As discussed, according to orthodox theory inflation shouldn't matter much;
while it might temporarily "fool" people in the short run, in the long run it
cannot have any effect. Even orthodox economists have empirically estimated
that "moderate" rates of inflation -- up to 40% per year -- have no measurable
effects on GDP growth. These theoretical and empirical results, however,
contrast markedly with orthodox policy prescriptions -- which call for vigilant
central bank watch over inflation rates. Indeed, at the beginning of the new
millenium, orthodox consensus appears to be that central banks should only be
concerned with inflation and that they should keep inflation below some very
low rate, such as two percent per annum. What is most remarkable is that
orthodox economists are willing to impose very high ("short run") costs in
terms of high unemployment and low GDP growth in order to attain low
inflation -- the benefits of which are at best thought to be very
small.
In contrast, Post Keynesians believe that nominal prices do matter. Ability to
administer prices is essential, particularly given long-lived and expensive
capital equipment. As Ingham (2000) notes, money prices are the result of
complex power struggles -- both between capital and labor, and among capitalists.
When labor is strong, it can push up wages; in order for individual firms to
maintain markups from which profits are derived, they must raise prices in
compensation. This could be called "cost-push" inflation, and would be more
likely to result from decentralized wage bargaining in the presence of strong
labor unions, with each individual union trying to obtain larger-than-average
wage increases for members and possibly generating a wage-price spiral. On the
other hand, "markup" or "profits" inflation results when firms are able to
raise the markup over wage costs. At the individual level, the markup is
largely the result of oligopolistic pricing processes, however, as discussed,
the aggregate markup is determined by certain kinds of spending. Thus, the
aggregate markup over wage costs will be higher if investment spending, the
government's deficit, the trade surplus, or capitalist consumption is higher.
All things equal, a society with rising investment or exports or government
deficits as a percent of GDP will face higher rates of inflation as the
aggregate markup will have to rise to ensure that domestic workers can
purchase only a falling share of output. The only alternative would be for
wages to fall, allowing the markup to rise without forcing prices
up.
Inflation caused by rising wages or rising markups is often called "incomes
inflation" to indicate that it results from a struggle to increase the income
of either labor or capital. In addition to incomes inflation, overall price
increases can be induced by rising "spot prices". The best example would be an
increase of energy prices such as those experienced during the mid and late
1970s, and repeated on a lesser scale in 2000. Rising energy prices of course
affect the cost of production of almost all goods and even of most services.
Firms will attempt to pass these along in the form of higher prices of
intermediate and final goods. If energy prices are increased only once, this
could cause only a one-time "price shock" resulting in a higher aggregate
price level. By itself, this would not be defined as inflation, which implies
continuing price increases. However, the price shock could set off a struggle
by workers to maintain nominal income shares (and real -- inflation
adjusted -- wages), which could generate a wage-price spiral if firms attempt to
maintain markups.
Note that inflation is much more benign than deflation in a monetary
production economy. The main impact of inflation is on distribution of
income -- it tends to redistribute shares toward economically more powerful
groups: from workers to capitalists, from nonunionized workers to unionized,
from unskilled to skilled workers, from "fixed income" pensioners to those of
working age, and from competitive sectors to oligopolistic sectors. On the
other hand, inflation tends to reduce debt burdens (and reduce
inflation-adjusted returns to creditors) -- which tends to favor lower income
households as well as "industry" over "finance". Thus, on balance, the effects
of inflation may well be favorable toward encouraging investment and economic
growth. In contrast, deflation not only has significant redistribution effects
(opposite to those listed above), but it also increases debt burdens. This
favors "rentiers" over debtors, but only if the debtors do not default.
Significant deflation will generate bankruptcies, in which case even creditors
are no better off. Indeed, Fisher's "debt deflation theory" (adopted by
Minsky) attributes the severity of the Great Depression to price deflation
that generated a snow-ball of bankrutpcies that destroyed financial wealth.
Thus, Post Keynesians generally recognize that deflation is a much more
serious problem than is inflation.
Post Keynesians have traditionally offered some form or other of "incomes
policy" to attempt to deal with incomes inflation. Centralized wage bargaining
involving workers, capitalists, and government can be an effective process to
reduce the danger of a wage-price spiral. Such an approach has often been
followed in Scandinavian countries and to a lesser extent in Canada. This
approach has had far less success in countries like the USA, where
decentralized bargaining is the norm. Thus, some Post Keynesians (Weintraub,
Davidson) have formulated more formal structures, such as "TIP" (tax-based
incomes policies), which would use taxes to penalize firms that award wage
increases above some established level (usually related to productivity
increases). Note that it would not be necessary to impose such penalities on
all firms, for not all firms have sufficient market power to administer
prices. Thus, it should be sufficient to control wage increases granted by,
say, the top 500 firms in order to prevent a wage-price spiral from
developing. Others (Lerner and Collander) have advanced "MAP" (market-based
anti-inflation policy) which would allow firms to buy or sell the right to
raise prices -- a scheme that is similar to marketing pollution rights. Most
importantly, Post Keynesians reject the orthodox approach to
inflation-fighting, which is to slow economic growth. This is because while
orthodoxy sees inflation as virtually always the result of excess aggregate
demand, Post Keynesians argue that modern economies almost always have planned
excess capacity so that excessive demand is rarely the cause of
inflation.
To control spot-price inflation (such as oil price shocks), Post Keynesians
have advocated use of "buffer stock" policies. (Davidson PKMT) Notably, buffer
stocks have been used successfully to fight deflation, but less use has been
made of them to fight inflation. In the USA, the government instituted buffer
stock programs for various farm products and for "strategic" minerals and
fuel. The general idea behind a buffer stock program is that the government
would intervene to buy commodities when prices are falling and to sell when
prices are rising, hence, helping to stabilize prices. Note that these
programs stabilize individual prices, although if some of the commodities in
the buffer stock are an important part of the consumer basket, the buffer
stock policy would help to stabilize the overall price level. Indeed, Graham
() had advocated use of a commodity buffer stock program precisely to
stabilize the value of the currency. He would have expanded the program to
include a wide variety of commodities that make up the consumer basket. One
could even argue that a gold standard, alone, acts as something of a buffer
stock program to help stabilize the (domestic) value of a currency. However,
because gold is a relatively insignificant part of the consumer basket (it is
a small part of final sales, and enters as an intermediate good into the
production of only a small part of GDP), stabilizing the price of gold does
not do much to directly stabilize the overall price level. Obviously,
stabilizing energy prices would be much more effective, as energy does enter
directly and indirectly into the production of almost everything.
An even better buffer stock, however, would be labor. Labor enters into the
production of all goods and services, and, as Post Keynesians emphasize, wages
are the most important component of costs of production. Indeed, economists
have long recognized that maintenance of a "buffer stock" of unemployed labor
can be an effective means of holding down wage increases, thus, inflation -- this
is the idea behind Marx's "reserve army of the unemployed" as well as the
notion behind the infamous NAIRU and supposed Phillips Curve trade-off.
However, some PK economists have recently recognized that maintenance of high
unemployment as a means to moderating wage increases has a variety of
undesired effects. First, unemployment is costly in terms of lost output, and
due to the negative impacts that long unemployment spells can have on workers
and their families. Second, it may not be very effective at holding down wage
demands if the unemployed are not good substitutes for those workers who enjoy
market power. For example, if labor markets are segmented, with a "primary",
oligopolized, sector that employs privileged workers (say, highly educated,
unionized, white males) in jobs with stable career paths and a "secondary",
competitive, sector that offers temporary, low-skilled and lowly paid jobs to
others, then it is possible that maintenance of high unemployment simply
depresses the already low wages in the secondary sector with little impact on
the primary sector wages. For these reasons, some economists have advocated
use of an employed buffer stock, rather than use of unemployment, to help to
stabilize wages and prices. (Mitchell 1997, Mitchell and Watts 1997, Gordon
1997, Harvey 1989, Minsky 1986, Wray 1998)
This approach is actually quite consistent with the nC approach to money,
outlined above. While there are alternative formulations, the employment
buffer stock program would have the government offer a job (either directly,
as a government employee, or indirectly in private employment with wages paid
by government) to anyone ready, willing, and able to work. The wage and
benefit package would be fixed at some level, which would become the base
package for the economy. The government would essentially stand ready to "buy"
or "sell" labor, offering jobs to any workers who showed up, or offering
workers to any employers willing to hire workers out of the buffer stock. Of
course, employers would have to offer a more attractive job, or a better wage
and benefit package, to induce workers out of the buffer stock pool. In
economic booms, the buffer stock would be "selling" labor and helping to
dampen wage pressures (since wages in the buffer stock program would be held
constant); in recessions, buffer stock employment would grow and would prevent
wages from falling below the base rate (since workers could always choose to
leave the private sector and take buffer stock jobs). Employment in the buffer
stock program would be superior to unemployment because it would prevent
deterioration of labor skills, would maintain income at a base level, and
could actually be geared toward enhancing education and skills of its
employees to make them more productive. Recall that the nC approach emphasizes
that government is the monopoly supplier of HPM. As such, it can always "emit"
HPM to buy anything for sale in the domestic currency. This means it is always
financially able to run a buffer stock program, without fear that it will "run
out" of the money to buy the commodity (in this case, labor) that is for sale
when the government's bid price is hit.
Further, a key notion of the nC approach is that the value of HPM is
determined by what must be done to obtain it. If HPM "grew on trees" it would
be worth very little because anyone could simply pick it off a tree in order
to pay taxes. However, if one must work to obtain HPM to pay taxes, that gives
HPM value. By operating a labor buffer stock program the government is
essentially offering to provide HPM in exchange for labor. So long as the wage
and benefit package is not increased, HPM will maintain a stable value in
terms of the buffer stock labor it can purchase. This is not to say that all
wages in society will remain constant -- in an economic boom, it is likely that
demand for some specialized skills will cause wages for specific types of
workers to rise relative to the buffer stock wage. This will then induce two
processes -- it will encourage more individuals to pursue education and training
to obtain the specific skills demanded by markets, and it will encourage firms
to attempt to find ways to substitute less-skilled workers for those types of
workers in shortage (for example, by changing production processes, using more
capital plus lower skilled workers). In this way, the buffer stock program
complements "market processes" to reduce, but not necessarily eliminate,
inflationary pressures. 
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