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ENTITLED TO NOTHING:
WHY AMERICANS SHOULD JUST SAY ‘NO’ TO PERSONAL ACCOUNTS
by STEPHANIE A.
KELTON
I. Introduction
The issue of Social Security, long
considered the untouchable “third rail” of American politics, was avoided by
both Clinton and Dole in their bids for the presidency in 1996.
The current President, in contrast, seems to sense that, for the first time in
60 years, the political climate is right for the restructuring of this
once-unassailable program.
This note seeks to: (1) examine the
president’s plan to offer private retirement accounts; (2) consider the
counterarguments that have been raised by opponents of the president’s plan; and
(3) reflect upon the British experiences to highlight some of the difficulties
workers in those countries have faced in retirement. The note concludes with the
argument that Americans should reject the president’s plan and insist upon the
preservation of Social Security as we know it.
II. Have I Got a Deal
for YOU!
The president insists that the best way
to protect America’s younger workers is through the (partial) privatization of
Social Security. “As we fix Social Security, we also have the responsibility to
make the system a better deal for younger workers. And the best way to reach
that goal is through voluntary personal retirement accounts” (Bush, 2/2/05).
Although the White House has still not
released the full details of the plan, the president has explained that his
proposal would allow workers under the age of 55 to divert up to 4 percent of
their current payroll tax contribution into their own retirement accounts.
Workers who decided to participate would then depend upon benefits from two
sources: (1) the (now lower) guaranteed benefit they continue to receive from
Social Security and (2) the market benefit that accrues in the form of gains in
their personal account.
Those who decide not to establish a personal account are told that they “could
stay entirely in the current system” and that their “benefits are fully
protected” (A Guide to Social Security Reform, Speech 1, p. 3).
Workers are told that they will come out
ahead as long as their personal account earns a rate of return that exceeds the
rate of return on the Trust Funds:
The way that the
election is put before the individual in a
personal account structure of this type is that in return for
the opportunity to get the benefits from the personal
account,
the person foregoes a certain amount of benefits from the
traditional system.
Now, the way that election is structured, the person comes
out
ahead if their personal account exceeds a 3 percent real rate
of return, which is the rate of return that the trust fund
bonds
receive. So, basically, the net effect on an individual’s
benefits
would be zero if his personal account earned a 3 percent real
rate of return. To the extent that his personal account
gets a
higher rate of return, his
net benefit would increase as a
consequence of making that decision . . . .
. . . the specific trade-off that you’re making in
opting for a
personal account is based on your decision that you think
you
can beat the 3 percent real
rate of return (my emphasis; White
House, Senior Administration Official, 2005).
But what about the risks? Investing in a
personal account means foregoing a portion of the benefits that otherwise would
have been received under the traditional system. In addressing these concerns,
Republicans have emphasized the prospects for higher returns and downplayed the
risks associated with market investment.
Thus, in stump speeches across the
nation, Republicans are asking a simple question: Do you want “your” money in a
Trust Fund that earns a 3 percent real return, or would you prefer to invest it
in a personal account that might yield nearly 7 percent after inflation? Using
these figures, they hope to persuade Americans that the answer is fairly
obvious. Personal accounts offer better prospects for growth and, ultimately, a
more comfortable retirement. This is especially true in the case of younger
workers, explains White House spokesman Trent Duffy, because they can get in
early and experience “the magic of compound interest” (quoted in Vandehei,
2005).
Finally, personal accounts are said to
enable average Americans to participate in an “ownership society,” creating
millions of “worker-capitalists with a direct interest in sound economic policy”
(A Guide to Social Security Reform,
Case Studies, p. 21). And, since workers “own” their private accounts, the
government is prevented from spending their contributions. Moreover, any portion
of the account that isn’t used for retirement can be passed on to one’s heirs.
It is a plan that sounds almost too good to be true: ownership, higher
anticipated returns, protection from government, and something to bequeath to
one’s survivors.
III. If It Sounds Too Good To Be True …
While the president and his allies have
emphasized the potential gains that might accrue through investment and the
magic of compound interest, they have downplayed many of the less pleasant
aspects of moving toward a partially privatized system, including: cuts for
those under 55 years of age, administrative fees that cut into total returns,
the costs of financing the transition, and the windfall that might accrue to
financial middlemen at the expense of those who choose private accounts. The
purpose of this section is to ask whether, in the face of these downside
aspects, personal accounts are a good choice for Americans.
The Real Story on Benefit Cuts:
Bush’s Dirty Little Secret
Anyone who has heard the president
discuss Social Security reform knows how important the images of “choice” and
“freedom” have been in the marketing of private accounts. The president has
emphasized time and again the voluntary nature of his plan, stressing that it
gives workers the freedom but not the obligation to choose a reduction in
guaranteed benefits. But this is misleading, for nearly all workers would suffer
significant cuts in their guaranteed benefits under the president’s plan. This
is because his plan calls for a change in the way benefits will be calculated
for nearly everyone in the coming years. Let us consider the implications of the
proposed changes.
Currently, Social Security benefits are
calculated in four steps:
- The Social Security Administration
(SSA) keeps track of wage history and converts your past earnings into a
single number – your Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME).
- A formula is used to convert your
AIME into a monthly benefit
- If you decide to retire early, the
monthly benefit is reduced
- Upon retirement, benefits are
adjusted annually by a Cost of Living Allowance (COLA)
The second step requires closer
examination.
The formula used to convert AIME into a
monthly benefit is:
90% of your first $629 of AIME, plus
32% of your next $3152 of AIME, plus
15% of AIME over $3,779.
The “bend points” – the $627, $3,152 and
$3,779 – are indexed each year to reflect growth in nominal wages so that when
the economy does well, retirees are permitted to share in the benefits economic
growth. And, since nominal wages tend to grow over time, the system promises
higher benefits to future generations of retirees than it pays to current
retirees.
If the President succeeds in redefining
the formula, the “bend points” will be calculated using an inflation index
instead of the current wage index. At first glance, this might seem like a
relatively innocuous adjustment. After all, the historical trajectory for prices
is also upward, so benefits will still tend to increase over time. But prices
tend to rise more slowly than nominal wages – over the long run – so benefits
would increase less rapidly under inflation-indexing.
Baker and Rosnick (2005) estimate the
impact of inflation-indexing on future generations of workers. Figure 4 shows
their staggering projections.
Source: Baker and Rosnick (2005)
As Figure 4 reveals, inflation-indexing
would sharply reduce the level of defined benefits. Indexing to inflation of,
say, 2% instead of nominal wage growth of, say, 3.2%, means that workers must
forego the 1.2% real wage growth that previously increased the “bend points” and
raised their defined benefits. The longer a worker must endure increases at the
(lower) inflation rate, the more severe the cuts will ultimately be. Thus,
America’s youngest cohort of workers would be most adversely affected by the
President’s plan to introduce inflation-indexing.
On top of these cuts, the president’s
plan gives workers the option to further reduce
their defined benefit by diverting a portion of their payroll taxes into a
personal account – a choice that seems to make sense for those who expect
their personal account to earn a rate of return that exceeds the rate of return
earned on Treasury bonds (held in the Trust Fund). But does it? Let us look more
closely at the implications of diverting withholdings into personal accounts.
Chart 1 shows the role of personal accounts in offsetting guaranteed benefit
reductions.
When a worker agrees to establish a
personal account he is effectively asking the government to lend him part of his
Social Security tax so that he can invest it in the stock market.
Democrats are particularly worried about
the impact of privatization on low-income workers.
In their view, the president’s plan would shift a disproportionate share of risk
onto low-income workers, who may not survive through retirement if their
personal accounts lose money. Indeed, some Democrats have argued that these
groups would be better off under the current system, which can only pay 73% of
promised benefits, than they would be under a partially privatized system that
might result in much larger cuts.
In sum, the president’s plan calls for
both voluntary and involuntary reductions in benefits. The former are incurred
only by those who choose personal accounts, but the latter are envisioned for
nearly everyone as inflation-indexing replaces wage indexing in the calculation
of defined benefits. Thus, unless one meets the government’s
(yet-to-be-specified) definition of “low income,” the president plan will
reduce guaranteed benefits, even for those who choose not to establish a
personal retirement account. This is something Americans must understand.
Transition Costs and the Explosion of
Debt
The portion of current payroll taxes
that gets diverted to personal accounts won’t be available to pay current
retirees. As a consequence, the government recently announced that it would
borrow huge sums in order to help pay for adding personal accounts to Social
Security.
These costs – estimates range between $1 and $2 trillion dollars – are
considered “transitional” because, as current retirees begin to die, costs
decline, disappearing altogether (along with beneficiaries) over the longer
term.
Both those critical of and those
supportive of the president’s plan have raised concerns about the costs
associated with transforming the system to include personal accounts. Critics
(mainly Democrats) argue that the president's privatization scheme is fiscally
irresponsible because it adds hundreds of billions to the federal deficit and,
ultimately, trillions to the national debt.
Tom Davis R-VA offered a less hostile critique, suggesting that “[f]loating a
bond issue of a trillion dollars is not the message you want to send to the
markets right now” (Froomkin, 2004).
Finally, Alan Greenspan, who has been generally supportive of the president’s
plan to introduce private accounts, has admonished the White House, arguing that
increased spending to finance the transition to personal accounts may put the
federal budget “on an unsustainable path, in which large deficits result in
rising interest rates and ever-growing interest payments that augment deficits
in future years” (quoted in Hays, 2005).
Others have simply questioned the logic
of selling bonds to help facilitate the purchase of stocks, noting that when the
government floats bonds in order to finance the transition to a
partially-privatized system, it means that investors are exchanging stocks –
those being sold to individuals who will hold them as assets in their personal
accounts – for newly-issued Treasury debt. This begs the question: why would
investors agree to add over $1 trillion in long-term government debt to their
portfolios if the stock market is expected to outperform government bonds over
the long haul? The implication, as Krugman points out, is that “politicians are
smart – they know that stocks are a much better investment than bonds – while
private investors are stupid, and will swap their valuable stocks for much less
valuable government bonds” (Krugman, NYT, 2005).
The Short-Run Bubble Effect and
Longer-Term Prospects for Stock Market Growth
While it is not difficult to envision
stocks outperforming bonds over the long-haul, it is quite conceivable that
stocks will generate even larger short-term gains, as tens of millions of
Americans begin buying shares for their personal accounts. The prospect of a
sudden surge in the demand for shares has raised concerns about the possibility
of a short-term bubble in stocks prices – a consequence of too many dollars
chasing too few shares.
If privatization puts upward pressure on stock prices, those who already own
shares of large cap stocks and those who manage the transactions would reap
significant gains, while today’s youth would suffer lower rates of return, as
they buy into the market in the midst of a stock-price inflation. Thus, as
Kenneth Apfel, Social Security commissioner from 1997-2001 suggests, Bush’s
proposal calls for “a radical restructuring that’s not in the interests of the
young and old alike” (Apfel, 2005).
But the young need relatively high rates
of return in order to compensate for the cuts they would suffer under the
president’s plan. And the president insists that the stock market can deliver
these rates, telling Americans that “[p]ersonal accounts are a better deal,”
because “your money will grow, over time, at a greater rate than anything the
current system can deliver” (State of the Union Address, 2005). Specifically,
the White House has projected a 6.5 percent real return on private accounts. At
this rate, private accounts are projected to yield returns high enough to cover
projected fees plus inflation, thereby raising the income and consumption of
future retirees.
But, as his critics point out, retirees
may actually end up with less if the stock market fails to perform the way the
Administration implies that it will. For example, Paul Krugman, a vocal opponent
of Bush’s plan, points out that equity serves only as a potential source
of future revenue. Equity is a claim on corporate income that provides gains
when: (1) the corporation pays cash dividends or initiates stock buybacks, or
(2) rising stock prices yield capital gains. Thus, Krugman notes that the
Administration’s projected 6.5 percent return is possible only if, in addition
to the 3 percent currently coming from dividends and buybacks,
inflation-adjusted stock prices increase by 3.5 percent. In the short run,
Krugman admits that this is clearly possible. But the Bush plan requires these
high rates of return “for at least the next 75 years” (Krugman, 2005, NYT). The
problem, he points out, is that the Trustees’ own assumptions about growth,
inflation, etc. make this a highly dubious outcome.
If, as the Trustees project, the economy
slows from its historic 75-year average growth rate of 3.4 percent to a rate of
only 1.9 percent over the coming 75-year period, it will be virtually impossible
for shareholders to earn an inflation-adjusted 6.5 percent rate of return in the
stock market. With such low growth rates – and hence low profit growth
– cash dividends and stock buybacks will account for an increasingly small
portion of the total yield on stocks. This, of course, places an ever increasing
burden on the portion derived from capital gains. But this would require an
increase in stock prices that outstrips profits for the next several decades,
something that would push the average price-earnings (P/E) ratio to five times
its current level.
Thus, based on the Trustees’ predictions about the future course of U.S. growth,
Krugman argues that an after-tax annual rate of return on the order of 6.5 to 7
percent “is mathematically impossible” (ibid.). He is also quick to point out
the irony in this conclusion: “if the economy grows fast enough to generate a
rate of return that makes privatization work, it will also yield a bonanza of
payroll tax revenue that will keep the current system sound for generations to
come” (ibid.).
Administrative Costs and the Windfall
for Wall Street
Under the current system, less than one
cent out of every dollar paid into Social Security benefits goes to pay
administrative costs. In contrast, privately managed retirement accounts, like
those in Chile and England, “waste 15 cents of every dollar paid out in benefits
on administrative fees” (ibid.). Thus, critics maintain that the costs of
administering more than 100 million small, private accounts “could dwarf Social
Security’s administrative overhead, which currently amounts to less than 1
percent” (Dreyfuss, 1996, p. 3).
The president insists that his plan
would contain these costs, estimating that only about 5 cents of every dollar
paid out in benefits would go to money managers. But even if the president
succeeds in limiting the fees that financial intermediaries can charge to
administer personal accounts, Wall Street stands to gain $940 billion or more
(in present value terms), according to University of Chicago business school
professor Austan Goolsbee.
Goolsbee’s findings fueled criticism from Democratic Presidential Candidate John
F. Kerry, who claimed that the president was pushing privatization in a
quid-pro-quo move designed to benefit Wall Street donors who contributed
generously to his campaign – a claim that does not appear to be farfetched.
The serious push for privatization began
over a decade ago, with a coalition of conservative ideologues (neo-cons) and
Wall Street money managers, determined to dismantle Social Security and replace
it with a system of individual retirement accounts. Around this time, the
Washington Post predicted that “[b]y 2010, more than $4 trillion a year
could be pumped into the stock market from Social Security account plans,
generating as much as $44 billion in annual fees for Wall Street under the
personal security account plans” (Fromson, 1997). State Street Bank & Trust, a
little-known Boston firm, which specializes in the management of smaller
accounts, was one of the many firms that wanted a piece of the action. It had
its own privatization agenda, but it also began to seed “other research groups
with about $100,000 in grants – including about $20,000 to the libertarian CATO
Institute’s privatization project” (IAF, 2001).
The mutual-fund industry, which was also
poised to capitalize on this opportunity, began “funneling millions of dollars
in seed money to think tanks, ‘grassroots’ organizations, and politicians
friendly to the ideas of privatization” (Dreyfuss, 1996).
To realize their goal of privatization,
these investment companies needed two things – politicians willing to promote
their cause and the capitulation of the American public. In the run-up to the
1996 Presidential election, fund managers and heads of major investment banks
began greasing the palms of the Democratic and Republican nominees.
And, while neither candidate adopted privatization as part of his political
agenda in the mid-nineties, Wall Street brokers were not dissuaded.
In the run-up to the 2000 election,
Charles Schwab, Dan Cook
(Goldman Sachs) and Richard Gilder (a stockbroker) were busy “pouring money into
the presidential campaign of George W. Bush” (Silverstein, 2001, p. 1). And so
were scores of other brokers and money managers. In total, Wall Street shelled
out $10 million in campaign cash to the GOP (ibid.). By June 18, 2001, Treasury
Secretary Paul O’Neil was on board, throwing his shoulder into Wall Street’s
push for private accounts. At a luncheon high atop the World Trade Center, he
served as keynote speaker, helping participants such as Citigroup Inc., Deutsche
Bank AG and Morgan Stanley raise money for a $20 million campaign to support the
privatization of Social Security (IFA, 2001).
While Republicans insist that Wall
Street does not stand to reap extraordinary benefits from privatization,
security brokers and investment managers clearly see things differently, doling
out staggering sums to politicians, conservative think-tanks and grassroots
privatization campaigns, in the hopes that their dream of charging fees and
commissions on nearly 100 million new accounts might one day be realized. And
when the conservative Wall Street Journal characterizes the privatization
of Social Security as potentially, “the biggest bonanza in the history of the
mutual fund industry,” you can be sure there is something to the claim
(Dreyfuss, 1996a).
IV. Evidence from the UK: (Big) Brother Can You Spare a Dime?
It is sometimes said that a fool learns
from his mistakes, while a wise man learns from the mistakes of others. In
recent years, a number of countries around the world have converted their
government-sponsored retirement programs into systems that rely, in whole or in
part, on private accounts. The purpose of this section is to examine some of the
problems that have emerged as a consequence of privatization in the United
Kingdom, where private accounts have been in place for over a decade.
The British Experience
While Americans can learn from the
problems that have arisen in a developing country such as Chile, it may be more
instructive for them to draw lessons from a large developed country such as the
United Kingdom. It is also easier to draw comparisons with the British
experience because the U.K. introduced voluntary “personal pensions” as
part of a partial privatization scheme. Additionally, the British
government switched benefit indexing from the higher of inflation or wage
growth to inflation only. Thus, the British framework more closely resembles the
model the U.S. government is trying to put in place at home.
The British retirement system has two
tiers: a first tier and a second tier. Under both tiers, benefits go to men at
age 65 and to women at age 60. The first tier provides mandatory flat-rate
weekly benefits (paid by the government) which are independent of earnings.
This level of benefits was put in place in 1908 to ensure minimum (i.e. poverty
level) benefits to retirees. The second tier, introduced in 1961, provides
earnings-related benefits from either public or private pensions.
The introduction of this second tier
marked the first phase of privatization, because it gave employers the option
not to participate in the public portion of the second tier and, instead,
establish a private second tier known as an “occupational pension”.
In 1978, the British government introduced the State Earnings-Related Pension
Scheme (SERPS), which improved the second-tier public pension by
replacing a higher percentage of contributed earnings. Thus, upon retirement,
British workers would either receive (1) a small, first tier pension plus a
second-tier pension through SERPS or (2) a small, first-tier pension plus an
employer-sponsored occupational pension. Under either scenario, workers were
protected under a defined benefit plan.
The second phase of privatization came
in 1988, when the government allowed workers to voluntarily opt out of either
the public SERPS or the employer-sponsored occupational pension and set up
tax-deferred, individual accounts.
Those who chose to opt out of the second-tier coverage would draw only their
small, first-tier pension plus whatever their personal accounts could provide
when annuitized.
Thus, the U.K. system currently resembles the model envisioned by President
Bush, where workers would continue to draw a portion of their benefits from
Social Security but would rely more heavily on the annuitized value of their
personal accounts.
If we were to measure the success of the
British reform simply in terms of worker participation, we would have to
conclude that the second phase of privatization was a great success.
Roughly 3.1 million people opted out of the SERPS during the first year. And, by
the end of the fifth year, another 2.3 million people had joined them in
establishing “personal pensions” (Department of Social Security, 1998, Table
26.0). But, of course, success is not so easily judged.
With the passage of time, workers have
discovered many of the system’s flaws. First of all, they have come to realize
the detrimental effects of inflation-indexing.
Since inflation typically increases about one-and-one-half to two percent
more slowly than wages, workers who remain in the second tier can
expect benefits that are forty to fifty percent lower than they otherwise
would have been. Worse, opting out of the second tier hasn’t proven to be much
of a safeguard.
Scandals and fraud have plagued
Britain’s money managers, delivering a black eye to the very idea of privatized
public pensions. In exchange for their services, financial middlemen often
gouged workers, charging “not only an initial fee (including a percentage
commission and a lump sum), but also an annual fee on invested funds and a
monthly flat fee that is generally indexed according to price or wage increases”
(Liu, 1999, p. 36). In some cases, these charges were more than 20 percent of
contributions. For an estimated 30 to 40 percent of account holders, fees and
commissions are so high that workers never earn enough to recover their
principal (ibid.).
To reap these fees and commissions,
money managers aggressively marketed their services, indiscriminately
recommending personal pensions to every generation of workers. In 1992 a random
sample of accounts was audited by the Securities and Investment Board. The
audit, which was performed against the objections of the insurance industry,
revealed that “a staggering percentage of pensions had been sold to those who
would be worse off in retirement as a result” (Cohen, 2005, 3).
The findings resulted in a scandal that generated enough of a public outcry that
the government was forced to act. In the end, some 1.7 million people “sought
and received compensation that ultimately cost the insurance industry £12
billion. In addition, hundreds of millions were paid out in fines and penalties.
It was the biggest financial scandal in the United Kingdom to date” (ibid.).
Nearly half of British retirees now
qualify for additional benefits under a separate welfare program for the
elderly. To avoid this fate, more than 500,000 people decided to opt back into
the state plan
in 2002-03, and another 500,000 joined them in 2004.
Another 250,000 are expected to opt back in this year, a trend that is expected
to continue into the future. There is a lesson here for Americans. As Robin
Ellison, Chairman-elect of the National Association of Pension Funds in the U.K.
recently noted, “[i]t is curious that as we’re moving towards one system, the
United States appears to be thinking and moving to the system we’re moving away
from” (National Public Radio, Record Number: 200502171004). Perhaps failing to
learn from the mistakes of others will make us the greatest fool of all.
VI. Concluding Remarks
As Americans, we used to be entitled to
certain things – government-sponsored health insurance, education, and various
forms of welfare protection. Increasingly, the government is telling us that we
are entitled to nothing. Current and previous Administrations have weakened
welfare, unemployment and after-school programs and pushed school vouchers,
medical savings plans and private Social Security accounts. And, so far, there
has been little resistance to many of these reforms. In particular, younger
Americans seem unafraid to “go it alone,” perhaps reflecting a shift in their
attitudes toward dependency, work and worthiness.
But before America’s youth throw their
support behind the president’s plan, convinced of their ability to provide for
themselves in their retirement, they should remind themselves that, they, like
their forefathers have done the work, paid into the system and earned the right
to receive the benefits they have been promised. And they should recognize that
some of their security has already been sacrificed, as scores of our nation’s
employers continue to replace guaranteed pensions with 401(k) plans. Acquiescing
to the president’s plan would simply remove another leg of the stool, reducing
their guaranteed benefits and placing their future security in the hands of
indifferent market forces.
Social security is a social insurance
system, designed to guarantee a minimum income to our nation’s elderly in
retirement. It was never intended to help Americans build financial wealth or
create “worker capitalists.” Before they allow the prospects of large financial
returns to persuade them to support a plan that may significantly undermine
their future well-being, America’s youth should remember that “more than half of
seniors receive a majority of their retirement income from Social Security”
(Tanner, 2004, 1). If this trend persists, odds are, today’s worker will
eventually depend heavily on the benefits paid by Social Security. And, if the
British experience has taught us anything, it is that the costs and risks
associated with private accounts far outweigh the value of the returns they are
likely to generate.
But the current debate should be about
more than narrow self-interest. It should about the kind of society we want to
have. Are we willing to ensure the security of America’s elderly and disabled or
are we content to place their fate in the hands of capricious markets? Will we
sit idly by as more and more Americans slide into poverty or will we be forced
to act when future retirees find it impossible to survive on the annuitized
value of their personal accounts plus their reduced benefit payments? In an
ideal world the answers would be obvious – Americans would reassert their
commitment to our nation’s largest and most successful entitlement program and
just say ‘no’ to the president’s plan.
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In 2002, more than 60 million
Americans between the ages of 25 and 64 reported incomes of less than
$25,000. And, according to government statistics and polling results,
many of them are already worried about how they will survive their
retired years. This is not surprising, since many low income workers are
unable to build up sufficient savings during their working years and
tend to have small or no pensions when they retire.
And the administrative costs
don’t end at retirement. Workers who live long enough to reach
retirement will be required to purchase an annuity – monthly payment
that ceases only upon death. But financial firms typically take another
substantial bite out of workers, charging anywhere from 10 to 20 percent
of accrued savings to set up the annuity (Baker and Rosnick, 2004).
Merrill Lynch gave a reported
$472,930 in political donations in 1996, including $27,150 to Bill
Clinton and $36,300 to Bob Dole, while Fidelity Investments and T. Rowe
Price began to openly call for Social Security reform (Dreyfuss, 1996).
Unlike the large brokerage
houses that manage their accounts, workers can lose big when the market
swings against them; the profits of the financial middlemen tend to be
more buoyant, rising even when the market turns bearish. This happened
in Chile in 1995, when a lull in the stock market caused workers to lose
4 percent of their investments. At the same time, the firms that managed
their accounts earned profits of more than 20 percent (Dreyfuss, 1996).

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